Abstract. This paper develops a model that jointly explains the frequent excess demand for performance events and the presence of anti-scalping laws. The explanation is based on the fact that the buyers of tickets are also an important input into the performance experience. If buyer wealth is negatively correlated with that particular buyer's suitability as an input, the use of lineups as a screening mechanism (leading to apparent underpricing) may be profit maximizing. Such a mechanism is not possible, however, if the resale of tickets above the posted price is permitted.
Introduction
Concerts and sporting events present an interesting puzzle for economists in that tickets to such events frequently seem to be in excess demand. Further, the resale of tickets for greater than the posted price (scalping) is usually prohibited. Why should people be prevented from exploiting gains from trade? Moreover, why should the need for such a law exist? Why don't promoters of these events raise ticket prices so that there is no excess demand? Thus far economists have offered explanations for these phenomena in isolation but not jointly.
This paper develops a model that simultaneously explains both of these puzzles.
It proposes that performance attendees are an important input to the experience and that individuals are heterogeneous in their quality as an input. A rock concert or sporting event in a venue full of screaming and yelling fans is considerably more entertaining than one where the fans quietly sit in their seats. At an opera or classic music performance, however, such behavior would detract from the experience. The desired Date: February, 2004 . The first author acknowledges research support from The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
characteristics of opera-goers might include fancy dress and a sense of decorum. In either case, the amount that people are willing to pay for a ticket depends on who else is attending. The promoter, then, has incentive to employ screening mechanisms in order to select between potential customers. If a customer's willingness to stand in line for a ticket is correlated with her quality as an input, then lineups may be a useful mechanism.
If the desired attribute of buyers is positively correlated with wealth, then the promoter will simply clear the market by setting a high enough price. In other words, for events such as the opera, where viewing members of "high society" may be part of the enjoyment, we should not expect to observe excess demand and/or scalping. However, if the desired attribute is negatively correlated with demand, then the promoter may choose to screen for the desired attribute along non-monetary lines. In particular, if the cost of lining up is negatively correlated with the desired attribute but positively with wealth, then lineups can be an effective mechanism for selecting the most desired customers. By asking customers to wait in line in order to purchase a ticket, the promoter can ensure that low-quality customers, who are willing to pay a higher monetary price but are less willing to stand in line, do not attend. This leads to a better concert experience. The promoter maximizes profits with a lineup if the amount high-quality (but low income) customers are willing for the best concert experience is greater than the amount the low-quality (but high income) customers are willing to pay for the worst concert experience.
An interesting implication for the resale of tickets arises when promoters use lineups as a screening mechanism. If customers are allowed to resell their tickets at any price, then promoters are unable to use lineups as a screening mechanism. High income customers with high lineup costs (but with low quality) are willing to pay more for a ticket in the absence of a lineup. So, once low income customers with low lineup costs have purchased a ticket, they would like to sell their ticket to the a income customer. However, in this framework there is a good reason for anti-scalping legislation. The seller and buyer are also in a second supplier-demander relationship where the buyer of the ticket supplies the input. If the buyer is allowed to resell, then that is tantamount to input substitution. The quality of the input will be affected and thus the buyer of the input suffers economic damages if the supplier of the input is allowed to substitute (resell). As a result, the concert experience is diminished for all. Resale, however, would be foreseeable, and so the promoter would not be able to use lineups as a screening mechanism and so would sell only to the high income/low quality customers at a lower price. Anti-scalping laws are thus efficiency enhancing/preserving. If resale is legal only at the posted price, then the ticket holders will not want to resell and so the input quality is preserved.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present the general model. Section 3 considers the effect of anti-scalping laws. The conclusion follows.
Note that all the proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
There is a continuum of potential customers and one concert promoter. Each customer is characterized by two values, (v i , q i ), normalized to lie in [0, 1] 2 . The value of these is private information to the customer. The interpretation of v i is the valuation of that customer for a ticket to a concert of minimal quality. The interpretation of q i is that customer's 'quality' as a concert goer. This measures the amount of (positive) externality that the given customer contributes to the concert experience if he attends. 1 Suppose that there is a unit mass of consumers with v i distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Aside from the idiosyncratic valuation of the concert, given by v i , there also exists a common value component, made up from the contributions of all those attending through their q i . Denote this common value component, or concert experience, by e. For simplicity, it is assumed that the individual contributions to the concert experience are aggregated in such a way that e depends only on the average quality of those in attendance. Specifically, it is assumed that there exists a continuous and differentiable function e (q), where q denotes that average q i of the 1 In other words, v i is a (private) consumption value for the customer, while q i is a (private) production value of the customer to the promoter.
attendees. Note that since there is a continuum of customers, a single individual's contribution to the concert experience is zero.
Concert tickets are sold via a two part pricing system: one part is a monetary price, denoted p, which corresponds to the face value of the ticket. The second part is a non-monetary component, denoted by l, which can be thought of as the line length or any other special procedures a fan has to follow in order to qualify for purchasing a ticket. Each potential customer has a money-equivalent cost for l which depends inversely on the customer's quality component q i . The idea is that rabid fans will make the concert experience better for others, while also being more willing to jump through non-monetary hoops in order to obtain a ticket at any given price.
Total customer utility from the purchase of a ticket for a concert with externality level e at price p and line length l can be denoted as
The reservation utility level is normalized to 0 for all consumers.
A given consumer will purchase a ticket at (p, l) if
As long as
is either positive or negative for all v i , there exists a monotonic relationship between purchase value and reservation valuation, and hence a unique reservation level cutoff, with all consumers above (in the positive case) or below (the negative case) purchasing the ticket. Given the linearity of the monetary component in utility, these cases are determined solely by the properties of
If
The concert promoter is a profit maximizing producer. For simplicity the production costs are normalized to zero. We also abstract from the capacity choice problem and posit a maximum capacity K. The producer does not care about the level of the externality other than through its effect on the price she can charge. Profits therefore are simply N * p, where N ≤ K is the number of tickets.
2.1. Monotonic Valuations. As mentioned above, there exists a single cutoff value
We now consider these two cases. 
Since C l (·) < 0 it is easy to see that this implies l = 0 and p = v + q. In other words, if willingness to pay is increasing together with the individual's value to the promoter, there is no need to use a non-monetary screening device. This can be thought of the case for classical events such as operas, etc. The value customers add to the experience is in their fancy dress, etc, and this is most likely increasing in wealth. So using a monetary selection mechanism works just fine. Increasing price or line length above these values will reduce the customer base (sales) which might, depending on the way in which q and v relate, increase the externality, allowing for higher prices. Since line length does not benefit the promoter directly, while price does, the promoter will set line length to 0 in any case. So, for example, if q = v 2 so that quality increases as the square of valuation, then with a zero line length we know that
Since the number of those attending is 1 − v, the promoter's problem becomes
and hence
so the promoter will fill to capacity if K < 0.69434 and restrict to that level if capacity is larger.
2.1.2. Negative Monotonic. Now suppose the relationship is monotonic but negative.
Hence there exists an
Again, all customers below v will wish to purchase, and so the customers with
Notice that a reduction in the line length again allows for an increase in the price without affecting the customer basis. Hence the line length will again be zero. Assume an interior solution for now, and that the promoter would wish to sell to capacity, so that 0 < v < v < 1 and K = v − v. An individual with valuation v is indifferent between purchasing a ticket and not, as is an individual with valuation v.
and so
and q = 1 − 1 2
. However, not every price and lineup length will lead to the market clearing. Specifically, it must be that
The promoter's maximization problem can therefore be written as
the corresponding first and second order conditions are
Since α > 1, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient. Solving yields
. However, evaluating v at this point yields
And so the optimal lineup length for the promoter will be the one that sets v = 0.
. Profits in this case are
Alternatively, the promoter could not use a line. At l = 0, however, 
Anti-Scalping Laws
Note that abstracting from the line, and assuming the equilibrium concert quality, consumers are willing to pay v i + 1 − K/4 and hence total demand for "line-up free" tickets at the face price of 1 − K/4 is 1: all fans are willing to pay the face price at the gate. Suppose resale at the face price is legal. A consumer who holds a ticket has valuation v + 1 − K/4 for it, and thus would only resell if p > v + 1 − K/4. Hence, at face value trading there will be no sellers. On the other hand, any individual buyer without a ticket would be willing to pay v+1−K/4, but has a higher v than any ticket holder. Resale would thus occur. But in that case the externality actually decreases, since -as far as the promoter and the other guests are concerned -an inferior input is substituted for the contracted input. Concert quality suffers. If such resale were allowed and foreseen, then the above would of course not be an equilibrium. Instead the promoter could only sell at a zero line, and not only promoter profits but -due to the externality -also social welfare is reduced.
